I. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
Carbon offsetting enables any party (firm, organization, individual) to compensate for the carbon emissions of its activities by financing a project that reduces greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. When the party's GHG emissions are exactly offset, the activity of the party is said to be carbon neutral. Today, carbon offsets are used in different policy contexts. In some cases, offsets are the result of a mandatory policy of pollution reduction and are a way to allow sharing environmental efforts in a cost-efficient manner. In other cases, offsets result from the voluntary environmental effort of a company or an individual. Firms may voluntarily comply with GHG emissions reductions. The prospect of a higher consumer willingness to pay (WTP) for GHG emissions reductions determines how much effort would be voluntarily provided by companies. Brander, and Van Beukering 2008) and show that consumers are willing to pay to offset the carbon emissions of their plane travels.
In this article, we focus on voluntary offsetting with an application to the agricultural sector, especially dairy production. Agriculture accounts for 14% of global anthropogenic GHG emissions and 9% of EU-27 GHG emissions. It is also the first source of N 2 O and CH 4 emissions, two very harmful gases in terms of CO 2 -equivalent emissions. However, no carbon cap-and-trade policy includes agriculture. The high number of small emitters and the difficulty in evaluating and monitoring emissions using standardized methods make it difficult to implement that type of policy (CEC 2009) . Although many studies recognize the importance of agriculture in any policy to fight climate change, no country considers emissions trading in agriculture as an option, except one: New-Zealand will be the first country to include agriculture in its emissions trading system in 2015. 1 At the moment, reduction of GHG emissions from agricultural sources is only voluntary. At an international level, in the Kyoto Protocol, voluntary carbon units from agriculture can be used in the Clean Development Mechanism (units from projects in developing countries) or in the Joint Implementation (units from developed countries). While at the European level, a cap-and-trade policy has operated since 2005, the EU Emissions Trading Sys-tem, for energy-intensive sectors (EPC 2003 2 ) agriculture is still a non-Emissions Trading System sector and can potentially provide only voluntary carbon credits. Livestock accounts for 39% of total GHG emissions from agriculture, with mainly two sources: enteric fermentation (32%) and manure management (7%) (Smith 2012) . Livestock management has a large potential for climate change mitigation.
In order to reduce carbon emissions, a firm may change its production process ("making" option) or use carbon offsets ("buying" option). The firm's choice between the two options is not neutral from the consumer's viewpoint. First, there may be spatial effects; that is, offsetting may shift joint local public goods to another region. Second, offsetting is criticized on moral grounds. For example, a website 3 offers in a satiric way to compensate infidelity by paying people who remain faithful. The point is that offsetting allows avoidance of the consequences of harming the environment, with a clear conscience. A similar argument was made by George Monbiot (2006) : "Just as in the 15th and 16th centuries you could sleep with your sister and kill and lie without fear of eternal damnation, today you can live exactly as you please as long as you give your ducats to one of the companies selling indulgences." We are aware of no policy report or journal articles specifically addressing moral issues in GHG offset policies. However, these issues are discussed in the literature on habitat banking. 4 Because the losing stakeholders differ from the gaining stakeholders, habitat banking policies usually include the "like-for-like" or "in-kind" principle, whereby the location where compensation takes place should be equivalent to the polluted site and induce no net loss. Some studies cast doubt on the efficiency of offsets because of high uncertainties: "One of the most common criticisms levelled at biodiversity offsets is that they exchange certain losses for uncertain gains" (Maron et al. 2012) . It is obvious the use of offsets to mitigate GHG emissions may have associated effects that may raise the same issues, because the losing stakeholders also differ from the gaining stakeholders. In the context of agriculture, any policy aiming to reduce GHG emissions may lead to associated externalities. We are especially interested in water quality as a joint local public good, since it is clearly an issue in France. On February 27, 2012, the European Commission referred France to the E.U. Court of Justice for failing to apply the Nitrates Directive (European Council 1991) .
We used a stated-choice web survey of a sample of consumers from two French regions to meet three objectives: (1) we aim to elicit consumers' WTP for producers' use of the "making" policy (producers' own green practices) as compared to the "buying" policy (purchase of offsets to someone else who "makes"), controlling for spatial effects (joint local public goods); (2) we seek to determine if consumers' opinions in favor or against offsets translate into their choices; and (3) we elicit consumers' WTP for GHG emissions reduction and its determinants.
We used a stated-choice web survey of a sample of consumers from two French regions, enabling us to control for spatial effects. We collected responses from 722 individuals. We find consumers are willing to pay for a "making" policy (producers' own green practices). The use of offsets by producers decreases the WTP. As a consequence, consumers are less willing to pay for a "buying" policy than for a "making" policy. Consumers do significantly care for the producers' use of offsets when the level of local externalities is controlled for. We find that belonging to an environmental association negatively influences preferences for offsets, whereas attitudes on offsets do not. Finally, respondents are willing to pay for lower levels of GHG emissions. The main motivation is gift-giving, while those who do not support green products or are free-riders have lower WTP.
II. METHODS

Choice of Product, Attributes, and Experimental Design
We consider an application to milk produced in two regions in France: Bretagne (western France) and Picardie-ChampagneArdennes (northeastern France). We chose milk for two reasons. First, milk is a relatively homogenous product. As such, we expect the product to vary only in the attributes of interest (production process and location of production). Second, milk production implies cattle breeding, which is the largest agricultural contributor to GHG emissions in France (the agricultural sector as a whole contributes 20% of GHG emissions in France 5 ). We chose two contrasting areas in France in terms of GHG emissions and water pollution from farming. Bretagne has intensive cattle breeding farms, whereas Picardie-ChampagneArdennes has extensive cattle breeding farms and crop production. While Bretagne is a big contributor to GHG emissions (6.9 MtCO 2 e for CH 4 and 5.3 for N 2 O), 6 Picardie (1.1 for CH 4 and 2.5 for N 2 O) and ChampagneArdennes (1.2 for CH 4 and 3 for N 2 O) are smaller contributors. It is also worth noting that Bretagne and Picardie-ChampagneArdennes belong to two separate hydrological basins. Indeed, efforts to enhance water quality in one region have no effect on water quality in the other region. Water quality is then a local public good in each region.
The aim of the survey is to elicit consumers' preferences for milk produced under differing conditions, each representing an attribute in the stated-choice survey. In our survey, consumers were asked to make repeated choices among three options: their usual milk and two alternative versions. Each version of the product is described by six attributes (Table 1): a two-level attribute describing if milk production takes place where the respondent lives; a two-level attribute describing if the milk producer uses offsets ("buying" option); a two-level attribute describing production intensity (reduction in number of cows per hectare); a three-level attribute describing the level of a local public good (i.e., water quality); a three-level attribute describing the level of GHG emissions; a four-level attribute describing price increase. The location of milk production enables us to control for a preference for local production. The farm process attributes enables us to measure a preference for offsets as compared to the producer using extensification. Finally, the local public good attribute enables to control for the jointness rationale described above. In short, we want to know if consumers oppose offsets when changes in local water quality are controlled for. The fifth attribute is the global public good resulting from the on-farm pollution reduction or the use of offsets. The last attribute is the payment vehicle. Respondents could also choose no option and select "cannot choose" or "do not want to respond" options.
A full factorial design would imply descriptions of milk. 7 We use a 3 2 3 × 2 = 108 fractional factorial design to reduce the number of choices made by the respondents in the survey. The aim is to maximize D-efficiency to achieve balance and orthogonality. Balance requires that each level of each attribute appears the same number of times, and orthogonality requires that every pair of levels appears the same number of times across all of the pairs of attributes in each alternative. Furthermore, we restrict the design to situations that are not too obvious (e.g., Alternatives 1 and 2 have the same price and the same process) and not incoherent (for example, no choice set where Alternative 2 has a higher 7 Although having four levels (0%, 10%, 20%, and 40%), the price attribute is considered in the experimental design as a three-level attribute (10%, 20%, and 40%), since the 0% level appears only in the reference milk and never in the alternatives. Besides, the attribute that describes if respondent lives where production takes place is not part of the experimental design as such, since we address that issue in the sampling procedure by randomly surveying people for both regions. Therefore, in the experimental design, we have three three-level attributes (water quality, GHG emissions reduction, and price) and two two-level attributes (location of production and use of offset). price than Alternative 1 but with higher air and water pollution and same process). The design we finally used consists of 36 choice sets blocked in 12 groups of three (D-efficiency = 98%). Each respondent was presented with three choice sets, and there were 12 versions of the survey. Figure 1 presents an example of a choice set. In this example, the two alternatives to the usual milk are produced in two different regions (see first row). Consider, for instance, respondent i, living in Region A. Along with the reference product (usual milk), respondent i was presented with Alternative 1 and Alternative 2. Both Alternative 1 and Alternative 2 involve the use of offsets. Alternative 1 is better than Alternative 2 and usual milk in terms of water quality and GHG emissions reduction but is more expensive. Alternative 1 and usual milk are local products for respondent i, but Alternative 2 is not. However, water quality is improved in the respondent's region in Alternative 2, whereas it is improved in the other region in Alternative 1.
We anticipated some respondents in the survey would consider that extensification has an impact on milk quality. To prevent consumers from associating private benefits to the change of production method, a short paragraph before the presentation of choice sets explained that the only differences between the types of milk are their places of production, how they were produced (and therefore the pollution level), and their price; and that we ask respondents to consider the milk's intrinsic quality to be identical across the three types of milk.
Sample Selection
We used an Internet survey. Many studies compare web and mail surveys, and response rates are the aspect most commonly studied. Some authors find the response rates to be lower in web surveys (Shih and Fan 2007; Meckel, Walters, and Baugh 2005; Fan and Yan 2010) , whereas others observe higher response rates (Olsen 2009; Fleming and Bowden 2009 ). However, sampling procedures, reminder strategy, and survey scope differ a lot between these studies, explaining these contrasting results. As highlighted by Farrell and Petersen (2010) , Internet users are not perfectly representative of the overall population of a country. 8 For instance, in France, Internet users are younger and have higher incomes and educations than the average French person. However, as stated by Farrell and Petersen (2010) , it only implies that results have to be analyzed taking this potential representativity limit into account. Two authors do compare web surveys to mail surveys in the field of nonmarket valuation, one studies the WTP for environmental protection (Olsen 2009 ), the other estimates recreation value using the transport cost method (Fleming and Bowden 2009) . In these latter two papers, Internet surveys give the same results as mail surveys, even when the web and mail samples differ in their socioeconomic characteristics. In our FIGURE 1 Example of a Choice Set study, a number of e-mails were randomly sent in the two regions of interest (Bretagne and Picardie-Champagne-Ardennes) through an e-mailing company. Unfortunately, problems arose with the e-mailing company, and we are not able to know how many e-mails were sent. We do, however, know that randomness of e-mail selection was preserved in each region of interest.
III. RESULTS
Sample Description
There were 722 responses: 464 from Bretagne (64.27%) and 258 from Picardie-Champagne-Ardennes (35.73%). There are clearly more responses from Bretagne. We do not know if the response rate was higher in Bre- tagne or if more e-mails were sent in Bretagne. As mentioned in footnote 9, the main point of our study is how decision makers evaluate the trade-offs between production changes, use of offsets, and changes in environmental attributes and price. Table 2 presents the summary statistics on some sociodemographics variables and describes the interest of respondents as to local or global environmental groups (frequency and percentage for categorical variables and mean for continuous variables).
The sample mean respondent is older than the average metropolitan person in France (40.3 years old 9 ), since it is composed of adults only. The share of women in the sample is close to the average French metropolitan data (50.57% 10 ). Household income seems to be a little higher than the annual income of the French population, 11 as the median of French population's income is €28,740 per year, and the ninth decile is €59,900 per year. However, our sample includes around the same rate of low incomes as in the French population: in France, the first decile is at €12,930 per year. The education level in our sample is high. Unfortunately, national data on education and on political and social involvement are not very detailed. We know that, at a national scale, 6.6% of French belong to a nongovernmental organization that aims to provide charities or to defend common rights (Luczak and Nabli 2010) . Those in our sample seem to be more involved with environmental organizations than the average French. However, national data show that more educated and older persons are generally more involved than the younger and less educated. The high involvement in environmental organizations in our sample may be related to education and age.
The survey included one question about the attitude toward offsets, in relation to the second scope of the paper. This question was: "Do you think that polluters should be allowed to buy pollution offsets instead of reducing their own pollution? Please choose all answers that apply." Ten answers were proposed, five beginning with "Yes, because. . .", and five beginning with "No, because. . .". Table 3 presents the sample's attitudes toward offsets and the knowledge level on offsets. Most of the people in the sample had already heard about pollution offsets before reading the survey and did not want more information. People in the sample have more frequently negative attitudes toward offsets, than positive attitudes, based on moral grounds.
We also asked respondents about their concern for several items (air pollution, water pollution, farm production methods, employment, effects of global warming, farm animal well-being) at different geographical levels (respondent's area, France, world). The data are not presented here but are available upon request. A few results should be noted. First, the more global the item is, the less concerned respondents appear to be. Second, respondents are concerned by (1) employment, then (2) water pollution and farm production methods, and finally (3) animal well-being, the impact of global warming, and air pollution.
Factor Analysis
To reduce the number of variables in the set of attitudes toward offsets, we conduct a factor analysis. Factor analysis describes the variability among observed variables in terms of a lower number of unobserved latent variables, the factors. Observed variables, attitudes toward offsets, are then assumed to be a linear combination of the factors, opinions toward offsets.
A principal component analysis has been run with SAS/STAT software. 12 The first step of the factor analysis determines the number of factors, based on the eigenvalues. Two factors have eigenvalues larger than one and are kept for the rest of analysis. Factor anal-ysis provides factor loadings, which are the correlation coefficients between the variables and factors. A high loading means that the variables and the underlying construct (the factor) are highly correlated. To be able to easily interpret the loadings, the factor matrix is rotated. We chose a varimax rotation, which provides orthogonal/noncorrelated factors, which are more easily interpretable.
The factor analysis on the first set of variables indicates that two factors explain respondent reactions (Table 4 ). Kaiser's overall measure of sampling adequacy is relatively high (0.84), indicating the factor model is appropriate; values greater than 0.80 are considered sufficiently high for analysis. Loadings show that infavor is positively and highly correlated to all positive attitudes toward offsets. infavor corresponds thus to a positive opinion on offsets. against is positively and highly correlated to all negative attitudes toward offsets, so against resumes opposition toward offsets.
The third scope of the paper is to elicit WTP for GHG reduction, and its determinants. As attitudes toward pollution reduction No, because polluters should pay the full cost of cleaning up their own pollution.
-
No, because it is morally wrong to pay someone else to avoid cleaning up your own pollution.
No, because polluters should be punished as much as possible. 0.75 -No, because offsets imply some producers offer to respect the environment in the place of others, in return for money. It is wrong for producers to make money this way.
No, because the original victims of the pollution will still be forced to live with the pollution if the polluters use offsets.
and public goods may explain this WTP, 12 questions in the survey measure these attitudes. All of these questions are framed as affirmative sentences, with a Likert scale from 1 (I not at all agree) to 5 (I strongly agree). A factor analysis shows there are four factors (Table 5 ). Kaiser's overall measure of sampling adequacy is marginal (0.72), indicating the factor model is appropriate.
assur corresponds to the attitude that it is inefficient for the individual to buy environmentally friendly products, for two reasons: inefficiency of green goods in general, or insufficience of individual purchase (assurance effect). gift is altruism or the warm-glow effect. nogreen says that the individual does not buy green goods because it is useless. fride is free-riding.
Econometric Models
We use a standard specification of random utility. Our presentation of the empirical models follows Revelt and Train (1999) . In our study, consumer chooses from among three n alternatives ( ) the alternative that j = 1,2,3 yields the greatest utility. The probability of selecting an alternative increases as the utility associated with it increases. The individual consumer's utility level associated with the choice of an alternative in the set of alterj natives is written as in equation [1] .
It is a linear function of the vector of attributes presented to consumer in alternative X n j njt in set . The parameters are known to the t β n respondent but not to the researcher.
njt njt njt n njt njt with , , and . j = 1,2,3 t = 1,2,3 n = 1 . . . N The stochastic term is assumed to be ε njt independent and identically distributed extreme value type 1 and independent of . Let β n denote the consumers' y = ( y ,y ,y ) n nj1 nj2 nj3 sequence of chosen alternative in situation . We can write the probability for cont = 1,2,3 sumer of choosing alternative in set as
[2]
nitβ X n njt e ͚j Since the are independent over choice ε njt situations , the probability of the consumer's t sequence of choices, conditional on , is the β n product of logits (equation [3] ): As a first approximation, we considered preferences are homogenous so that .
This specification is a conditional logit model. This exhibits the "independence from irrelevant alternatives" restriction. We tested that hypothesis in our data and it is rejected. We then turned to a mixed logit model. Indeed, we are interested in examining the heterogeneity in the sample. Thus, we consider as a second step that preferences are heterogeneous among consumers, so that the conditional probabilities defined in equation [3] are integrated over all possible values of using β n the population density of . The probability β of the consumer's sequences of P( y ⎪θ) n choices conditional on the parameters of the distribution is displayed in equation g (β⎪θ) [4]: P( y ⎪θ) = P( y ⎪β )g(β⎪θ)dβ.
[4] n n n Ύ This is the specification of a mixed logit or a random parameter logit (RPL) model. We use a Monte Carlo simulation method to estimate the probabilities of choice (100 Halton draws) using the SAS MDC procedure. In the RPL model, we consider the parameters associated with all the attributes except price as random. The price coefficient is considered fixed, as in many other applications (Hensher, Shore, and Train 2005) , while all other coefficients are assumed normally distributed. So we estimated the mean and standard deviation of the normally distributed coefficients for all attributes except price. Table 6 presents the econometric results. We ran several random parameter logits without interactions (Model 1); with interactions with variables on opinions on offsets (Model 2); with interactions with other variables, notably on attitudes toward public goods (Model 3). The RPL model informs about heterogeneity in the sample but does not explain the source of the heterogeneity. We need to include interaction variables to be able to accomplish some of the objectives of the paper.
Econometric Results
In all these models we consider six attributes: local (1 if milk production is located where respondent lives and 0 otherwise), off (1 if producer uses offsets and 0 otherwise), extens (1 if the number of cows is reduced and 0 otherwise), h2o (the percent improvement in water quality), ghg (the percent decrease in GHG emissions), and price (the percent increase in milk price). This specification of attributes, and specifically of extens, allows disentangling the WTP for offsets (the instrument) and the WTP for extensification (the process change). We compute the marginal WTP for each attribute as the marginal utility of the attribute (attribute parameter) divided by the marginal utility of price (price parameter). In the survey, milk price is expressed as a percent increase of current price paid by consumers. To compute WTP in monetary form, we consider a €1 per liter reference price. Table 7 presents the calculated WTP for each attribute.
The aim of our paper is threefold. We will comment on the results according to each objective. First, we were aiming to elicit consumers' WTP for producers' use of the "making" option (producers' own green practices) as compared to the "buying" option (purchase of offsets by someone else who adopts green practices), controlling for spatial effects (joint local public goods). In all models, the coefficient on offset is significant and negative. Model 1 shows that consumers do care about the use of offsets when joint local public goods are controlled for: there is a significant negative "buying" effect. Using offsets decreases the WTP by €0.11 to €0.19 per liter (Table 7) .
Consumers are, however, significantly willing to pay for extensification, that is, the process change (extens). The analysis of the interactions with extens shows that those who think that a reduction of the number of cows per hectare would improve animal welfare (higher_animal_welfare) or improve water quality (lower_water_pollution) are willing to pay more for extensification, and more than those who think that extensification improves the landscape (improves_landscape). In other words, animal welfare or water quality is a stronger motivation to pay for extensification than the landscape. These results are in line with a concern in the European Union for animal welfare, especially in intensive cattlebreeding countries such as France. 13 Moreover, people who are concerned by farm production methods in the area ( farming_loc) are more willing to pay for extensification, whereas those who are concerned by farm production methods in France ( farming_Fr) are less willing to pay for extensification. This result might be explained by the fact that cattle production is not present in all the French regions. In other words, respondents might be concerned by other aspects of farm production methods, for which extensification does not mean anything. So they might be willing to pay for green practices other than extensification (for instance, reduction of pesticides). Some variables interacted with extens are not significant: consuming organic milk (org), being concerned about animal welfare at the local or national level (animal_welfare_loc and animal_welfare_Fr), and thinking that extensification reduces air pollution (lower_air_ pollution) or improves milk quality (higher_ milk_quality). The result on this last variable is in favor of our survey design. As mentioned before, we asked consumers to consider milk intrinsic quality as constant across the alternatives. It seems consumers did not consider that extensification has an impact on milk quality in the survey. The WTP for extensification is particularly high, between €0.17 and €0.21 per liter of milk (Table 7) . Since the "buying" option consists in purchasing offsets by another producer, and leads to an extensification in the other region, the overall WTP in the "buying" option is between €0.02 per liter (Model 1) and €0.07 per liter (Model 3), whereas the WTP for the "making" option is equal to the WTP for extensification, between €0.18 per liter and €0.21 per liter. In other words, the WTP for a "buying" option is much smaller than the WTP for a "making" option, because the use of offsets strongly decreases the WTP of the consumer.
Second, we seek to determine if consumers' opinions in favor or against offsets translate into their choices. Consider the opinion variables (against and infavor) that are interacted with the offset attribute. We find that interaction variables are not significant, maybe because some of the opinion effects are captured within the interaction with asso (people who belong to an environmental association). The interactions with other sociodemographic variables such as gender, age, and education have also been tested, but they are not significant. As a consequence, these variables have not been included in the models presented. We expected that people living in Bretagne would be less willing to pay for offsets, since pollution from agriculture is a crucial issue in Bretagne. We expected respondents from Bretagne to be more opposed to policies that do not reduce on-site pollution. However, the interaction between bret and off is not significant. Third, we elicit consumers' WTP for GHG emissions reductions and its determinants. Consumers are willing to pay €0.16 to €0.19 per liter of milk. Model (3) shows that consumers who do not trust green products for environmental protection (nogreen) and those who tend to adopt free-riding behaviors ( fride) are less willing to pay for a reduction in GHG emissions. On the other side, those who adopt altruistic attitudes (gift) are more willing to pay for a reduction of GHG emissions. Being reluctant to buy environmentally friendly products because of fear of wasting their contribution (assur) is, however, not significant.
Our econometric analysis also provides other results. Consumers are willing to pay €0.08 to €0.10 per liter of milk for production located in the same place they live (local). Three explanations might be proposed. First, our design does not allow disentangling the status quo effect from the local effect, because the status quo milk is produced in the same area as the respondent. Aside from this effect, people do care about local employment and the local economy, or people do care about local agriculture. As might be expected, interactions between opinions toward public goods (assur, gift, nogreen, fride) and reduction of water pollution (h2o) are very similar to interactions between opinions toward public goods and reduction of GHG pollution. One difference comes from the interaction with free-riding behavior, which is not significant in the case of water pollution reduction (h2o × fride), whereas it is significant and negative in the case of GHG emissions reductions (ghg × fride). This shows, as expected, that free-riding is reduced for local public goods (as water quality) by comparison to global public goods (as GHG emissions). The other difference comes from the interaction with the opinion that buying environmentally friendly products would not be helpful or efficient because not enough efforts are provided elsewhere (assur), which is significant and negative for water quality improvement, and not significant in the case of GHG emissions reduction.
Model 3 provides a better fit for the data than the other two models. A log-likelihood test shows that this difference is significant; Model 3 is clearly the best model. The loglikelihood test shows also that Model 2 would be preferred to Model 1.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The first objective of our paper was to elicit consumers' preferences for two kinds of voluntary environmental policies: one belonging to the "making" class (reduction of GHG emissions within the production process), and one belonging to the "buying" class (the producer pays someone else: carbon offsetting). By controlling for GHG emissions reduction and joint local pollution effects, it is shown that consumers on average are much more willing to pay for the "making" policy than for the "buying" policy. The WTP for the "buying" policy is the sum of a positive WTP for the adoption of green practices and a negative WTP for the use of offsets. A firm should then be able to raise more money from consumers through a "making" environmental policy than a "buying" environmental policy.
It is also shown that consumers who belong to an environmental association are less willing to pay for offsets. This result highlights the heterogeneity among consumers in terms of preferences over the environmental policy chosen (own effort versus offsetting). In our sample, this is the only variable to interact significantly with offsets. Neither sociodemographic variables nor general opinions toward offsets change the WTP for offsets.
Another interesting result of our choice experiment is the WTP for the local attribute: consumers are willing to pay a rather high amount for production located in the same place they live. It should be noticed that the design we used does not allow us to disentangle the "status quo" effect from the effect of the local attribute, since the status quo is a locally produced milk. However, this WTP is significantly higher than the WTP for a reduction of water pollution or GHG emissions. This result is consistent with recent work (Costanigro et al. 2011; Onozaka and McFadden 2011) in which the attribute "locally grown" is the highest valued among different sustainability attributes. Our result might be explained by the status quo effect, local employment, landscape or agricultural production concerns, or a purely local preference, since our design controls for joint local environmental effects. It would be interesting to disentangle the status quo effect from the local one, and to analyze what drives this WTP for a local agricultural production, by controlling for other joint local effects into the choice experiment design.
Finally, we want to stress that one of the results of our study is to show the limits of consumer involvement in environmental protection. Though it may be economically efficient to use offsets, consumers may oppose them on grounds that are difficult to determine. Our study showed that neither attitudes toward offsets nor the existence of a joint local public good can explain opposition to offsets. This leaves room for public intervention to set up the rules of the game and create incentives for firms to reduce their negative externalities. Formally comparing several policy options for GHG emissions reduction would be an interesting topic, though outside the scope of our study.
